AC48452 1Apr2026 Motion For Judcial Notice
Link to this blogpost: https://publiusroots.blogspot.com/2026/04/ac48452-1apr2026-motion-for-judcial.html
It is April 1, 2026. I was up all night, wanting to finish this. it needs to have my references to page numbers of the Appendix included. And I need to do a final edit of the printed copy.
I am confident there will be minimal changes so here it is now. Of course, cyber crime may interfere! And this is why I am getting this out of the way now, so I can edit and finalize it to upload before I have my dentist appointment.
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48452
NHH-CV24-5006875-S : APPELLATE COURT OF CT
ANNE M. BRADLEY : STATE OF CONNECTICUT
V : HOUSING SESSION
ANSONIA STATE
STREET, ET AL : MARCH 31, 2026
APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
REGARDING MOTION TO OPEN AT TRIAL COURT AND AFFILIATED DOCUMENTS IN APPENDIX
Pursuant to PB 60-3, Appellant, Pro Se, motions this court for Judicial Notice, as-is one of the selections which the Appellate Court provides, yet with no Rule Of Court which justifies it and provides the legal parameters on when it may be used.
HISTORY
This case arose as a final attempt for tenant Anne M. Bradley to get her rights as a Section 8 tenant. The abuses and breaches of the Section 8 contract have been continuous for 13 years, as shown by the Appellant in prior pleadings. There has not been any Motion For Judicial Notice seen which has been argued and therefore not heard on this case; and additionally Appellant could not find a Motion For Judicial Notice found in WestLaw in which it was actually treated as a motion.
That is the parady of this motion - which seems like a “wild card” in the court. Nevertheless, the aforesaid information is to supplement the Appellant’s efforts to justify she has a right to be compensated for 13 years of harm caused to her by the Appellees on this case.
FACTS
1. This appeal is based on setbacks by the court:
a) Failure of Due Process in Hearing Complaints
a) Defendants failed to Answer the Complaint Packet, which included an Appendix of 245 pages with an End Page.
b) Defendants failed to appear at the hearing, which the trial court nefariously scheduled past the required two-week period, AS SET BY LAW.
c) Judge Alayna Stone was impersonated by a woman who was about 20 years older than her; yet Alayna Stone did not even care and thus they were conspiring with each other both proved to be frauds.
d) Judge Alayna Stone has a fake Juris Number and thus most likely is a fake attorney and just a paid actor injected into a court system which lacks jurisprudence.
e) MOTION TO OPEN was not heard according to Due Process of Law. In fact, Judge Stone permitted the Motion and granted the fee waiver, simultaneously denying the motion! That certainly lacks jurisprudence, to say the least!
f) Appellant motioned first for extension of time to appeal aforesaid case, which was ineptly denied by Judge Stone, who is obviously not a real judge and continuously reflected instead Devil’s Chessboard Tactics, which CIA are known for when they domestically disrupt the United States, despite having no legal right to do so. CIA were created by Yale University, not the US Government.
g) Motion To Open can be heard when judgment of nonsuit occurs. Nonsuit is a court’s dismissal of a case or of a defendant because court perceives the plaintiff failed to make out a legal case or bring sufficient evidence.
i. The evidence was in the complaint packet! No one answered and the court failed to administer the law; they “played house” serving its wants.
2. The actual owner of the this building, 360 State Street, is NOT Ansonia State Street! They do not have the title of the property. They do not have the legal right to sell the property, which constitutes the right of an owner. Therefore other parties from the real estate and communication records were added, which may or may not be the owner. At one point they sent communications claiming Knox Rentals was taking all tenants’ payments. There was no business registered as Knox Rentals! At another point they claimed that South Oxford Management Living were the new owners, aka SOM Living. This company is owned by Gideon Friedman, who also owns Ansonia State Street, who also owns Ansonia Apartments, who also owns a number of other businesses. His agent of service is located in a building owned by COLONIAL FOUNTAIN MANAGEMENT; which was the owner of Appellant’s prior apartment at 564 Prospect Avenue, New Haven - which literally stole her $1,600 deposit from her and lied about why. Appellant had to go to the trouble of filing a small claim lawsuit against them yet was not properly heard. They hired a comedian, Barry Weintraub, to represent their company. Not an attorney. Not an accredited official of the company. A comedian, who refused to produce any credentials to prove his appearance was valid. The magistrate said it was okay for him to fail to identify himself in court.
a) We, as tenants at 360 State Street, found out shortly after this that was not true that SOM Living were the new owners and they pulled that communication from our devices quite easily due to the nefarious cyber setup of “now you see it, now you don’t”, which relieves them of accountability of virtually anything since their communications are far from being published. They can neither be printed or fully accessed due to originating from a website, which can be altered at whims.
i. It is quite odd that the court actually cites on their fee waiver court form ( Form _____) computer specialists which reflect “WCAG 2.1”. These specialists include Alastair Campbell (defined as Invited Expert, InterAccess - which is a suspicious title and certainly masks transparency), Michael Cooper (of W3C, which stands for a triune World Wide Web organization), Andrew Kirkpatrick of Adobe, and Joshue O Connor (without the apostrophe, which leads to suspicion this is a satanic code, since “O” is oftentimes used publically as some kind of ritual in communications within the government amd elsewhere -- which was initiated by Barack Obama (BO) and Oprah marketing - even creating a magazine titled “O”. The word “magazine” can also mean a lethal weapon. The letter “O” is oftentimes a cyber viral replacement for another character typed on phones during social communications as well as on computers from time to time in social communications in particular - such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Facebook was created by Mark Zuckerberg, who is really Robert T. Morris who received a phD in computer technology at Cornell University, and destroyed tens of thousands of computers with his “Morris Worm” December of 1988. It was at that time which Appellant had the pleasant opportunity to meet Hon. Colin Powell at the World War 2 building / Division Artillery Headquarters office which she worked in as Secretary of Command staff, being paid 2 grades lower than virtually any other Secretary on Post (they began at GS-5 as lowest grade) and made a temporary status with no benefits for three years, despite doing work which included needing a security clearance for. “We trust you” was their reason for enjoying something for nothing. Hon. Colin Powell mentioned to the Appellant that he was concerned that Bill Gate’s Microsoft would be integrating dishonest tricks into his software, now that he enjoyed the government contract of establishing all word processing systems after the Morris Worm destroyed all computer hard drives - both in the government as well as outside the government. (This parasitic affiliation with the government made him a billionaire.) Hon. Colin Powell emphasized the size of characters to be a concern, since frauding government documents in the US Army was such a common problem. He advised the Appellant to immediately report to the S-4 any concern of the size of characters changing in the same document which she typed, which was considered illegal due to lack of uniformity.
3. Neither the landlord at 360 State Street, New Haven, CT - nor the Housing Authority at 360 Orange Street, New Haven, CT will abide by its obligations and make up rules as they go along. The housing inspectors, another municiple agency, titled “Livable City Initiative” have only inspected this apartment once, which was two YEARS after the Appellant moved in the apartment. The Appellee-Bozzuto, who was paying all employees on site of the 360 State Street Property, assured the Appellant she could move in the apartment in just a few days - which was a lie - and it continued to extend to 28 days, saying “it hasn’t been inspected yet” as reason; though there were never any inspections before or after Appellant moved in, except for one which took plaee approximately two years later and no follow-up on the defects were ever made. The Appellant submitted a MOTION FOR DISCLOSURE on this aforesaid case, to Livable City Initiative, which the court deliberately failed to hear or rule on despite the fact it was properly prepared and distributed. The disabled Pro Se Appellant even took it to their office herself. LCI neither argued the motion or submitted an appearance on the case; yet the chief clerk marked this municiple agency as “self represented”!
4. The Plaintiff-Appellant cited laws from USC 42, specifically emphasizing 1437f, in which she was told, “We don’t follow those laws. We follow the CFR” which in essence reflects legal malpractic, which the Appellant-Plaintiff brought up when meeting with Dale DiBenedetto at the Housing Authority, aka Elm City Communities (which failed to appear at the hearing on October 31, 2024, and of course, all defendants failed to Answer the complaint). She assured the Appellant-Plaintiff she would meet with her as a follow-up since she said her Section 8 Contract oddly was “Archived” and she could not access it easily - when discussing the Section 8 contract, provided in the Appendix to the Complaint, is a tenant-based contract; not project based which Elm City Communities began insisting it was after their unsuccessful pancaking of “MTW” which can mean man-to-woman transgendering yet they ineptly defined it as “Move To Work” when in fact project-based tenants cannot move out of the project. They are not allowed portabiltiy, as so-stated by Elm City Communities. In other words, Elm City Communities was continously flip-flopping the contract rather than administer what was really on record. They had been arguing this change-to-project- based for the past 10 years, which the Appellant-Plaintiff claimed was illegal and it seemed obvious they were fitting their wants with whatever law would fit - rather than just comply with the tenancy-based contract as reflecting the Obama Agreement which Bozzutos had to agree with at the time this building was developed. All of the e-files of the Appellant have been stolen twice from her; once in New York City when she had a doctor appointment, using her FEDERALLY-FUNDING MEDICARE, FEDERALLY-APPROVED QMB, and once this past year by the HOMELAND SECURITY CONTRACTORS, American Security Services, when Appellant-Plaintiff went to the social security office to get replacements for her stolen Medicare and Social Security cards. The security officers stole $500 of computer supplies, all encased in a zippered, see-through case in her purse. Appellate Court is aware of this due to submitting that circumstance in full to the court, since it disrupted her efforts in defending her legal rights. Their stealing her supplies, which included all of her external e-files, greatly disrupted her efforts in her own defense for two basic reasons: 1) They could have more ease frauding court records using cyber crime; and 2) She was unable to access the actual documents she submitted on aforesaid case as well as the illegal eviction case which was entered thereafter, despite the court order which did not allow the defendants to enter any Summary Process against her while the case was pending. Appellant has had to rely on the court’s record, which is repeatedly frauded.
a) A clear example of this fraud is with “Plaintiff’s Preliminary Statement To Court’s Declaratory Judgment”, dated October 22, 2024, Pages 147 to 155 of Appelant’s brief, stamped in by the court on October 23, 2024, yet the court removed it from the docket using cyber crime. Document No. 118 is defined as a court order instead. (It is common sense that documents entered by plaintiffs, versus documents entered by defendants, versus documents entered by the court should be distinguished with separate numbering systems in order to prevent cyber fraud on the cases)
Appellant proved that the Appellee’s Notice To Quit was invalid for a number of reasons:
1) The obvious court-order to not proceed with a Summary Process, as indicated right on the Housing Complaint - yet the court refused to enforce its own order despite the fact the court agreed that Appellant’s rent was current and she began paying rent into court.
2) The rent for August and September of 2024 was paid; that was enterred as the subject matter jurisdiction of the case. Alayna Stone’s Memorandum of Law was in essence, a farce, making fraudulent claims such as the Appellant being a month-to-month tenancy for 12 years! Additionally the Memorandum of Law had typed characters which changed in size as well as seemingly deliberate typos as a possible means to alter the document at some future date. It has been typed line-for-line by the Appellant and is located in the Appendix to this Motion For Judicial Notice. Some lines fall short, some lines exceed the space - which reflects all probability that the characters are being altered in size as a possible manner of convenience to later fraud the record and get away with it, as learned from Hon. Colin Powell years ago.
3) Failure to issue a Pretermination Notice as required by law for Section 8 Tenants. The law and a caselaw was cited in Appellant’s brief, which the Appellees, who are hired attorneys who claim to be expert in Appellate cases, ineptly TOLD the court they would not be responding to the brief, nor did they care to appear for argument - which reflects deliberate disobedience to the Court Rules in which the court allows it as long as they money to the court, without providing any relief to the Appellant, who apposed this, and only when it was apposed did the court issue an order which stated they would have to pay money to the court, and thereafter continue to recognize their lack of diligence as acceptable rather than reflecting DEFAULT, which the Appellees committed in trial court as well.
a) Thereafter the Appellee as well as “Judge Stone” claimed the only lease was THEIR lease, of which a total of $932 a month for this very small efficiency apartment she was forced into (after leaving a one-bedroom apartment which was at least twice the size)
i. The court was completely disinterested in administering the law and this alleged judge - Alayna Stone - has no valid juris number; it is not in the Juris LookUp; and she has only proven that she is not an attorney and just a paid actor doing what she is told to do, as argued by the Appellant in trial court.
ii. The court - Alayna Stone - stated on record that the Pretermination Notice and Notice To Quit were one in the same, which is a lie and more judicial malpractice by a governor-appointed judge who is obviously not even an attorney - and that statement, along with a great deal more, were removed from the transcripts, which greatly fall short of even reflecting the real time spent at the hearings. (Note, Alayna Stone discussed this aforesaid case at the hearing on the Pro Se Appellant’s MOTION TO DISMISS the illegal eviction case)
iii. The assigned court (Alayna Stone) failed to preside over this case hearing, October 31, 2024, at which time a fraud claimed she was Alayna Stone and failed to hear the complaint in order of Due Process and allowed a fraud to claim he was Attorney Peter Hoops when he was obviously the grandson. (note, the SON of Attorney Peter Hoops of Hoops & Associates (not law firm) appeared at the illegal eviction trial and again the court allowed this fraud rather than verify identity - particularly since HIS son appeared prior to that on this case, which came first - and neither are licensed attorneys according the Juris Lookup!)
iv. As already mentioned, the court ordered all defendants of this case that they could not issue a Summary Process and yet the court did not even enforce it! More legal malpractice occurred, such as the LTKE Law firm for Elm City Communities (which is the Housing Authority that administers the Section 8 contract), did not appear at the hearing of October 31, 2024. Thereafter they seemingly entered another appearance into Appellate Court (which the court should have rejected since they claim appearances from trial court are assumed to be appearances for Appellate Court unless they otherwise withdraw those appearances). It may be that Bercham & Bercham Law Office located in Milford, CT were the only ones who submitted a [timely or untimely] appearance for Elm City Communities without Answering the Complaint or appearing at the October 31, 2024 hearing.
v. LTKE Law Firm claims that the Housing Complaint form which was submitted along with the Lawsuiit document and Appendix of 245 pages, along with the replacements which were marked as “Amended” by order of the chief clerk Attorney William Pitt, was not signed by the Chief Clerk, which is the court’s obligation to ensure the record to be adequate for review, particulary when a Pro Se party submits the forms. Nevertheless, based on numerous experiences of fraud and lies by the courts, the Appellant-Plaintiff submitted a replacement form which again was typed as was her first one in September yet was rejected on or about September 27, 2024. She insisted the Chief Clerk sign it in her presence before she is provided a stamped copy. The Chief Clerk came out and said the form could not replace what he already uploaded on the docket, despite delaying service process, which could have simply been legally satisfied by the Appellant’s mailing it to all parties, by the Appellant-Plaintiff. The Chief Clerk insisted she mark it as “Amended” at which time she did and made sure it was noted why: due to defective information on the prior one. This “Amended” form was made part of all served packets and visibly placed as the main documents to the complaint packets prior to the marshal serving them. This was recently argued in Appellant’s Response Brief of Appellee’s Response brief (which was past the legal due date with no motion to submit a late brief and no document of any sort entered on the due date; yet the court allowed a two-week extension based on rule which requies a rejected document. There was no document to reject!) The LTKE Law Firm nefariously claimed that the Chief Clerk did not sign the Housing Complaint Order on the Form, strategically attaching the orginal form (which had no legal value since it was replaced by the Appellant due to this) which Chief Clerk Attorney Pitt failed to sign, despite the fact it was replaced by the “Amended” form, which is Document ____ in trial court.
vi. Submitting complaints on attoneys and judges in this state is futile since the whole system is essentially a “do as I please” system rather than abiding by laws and rules; which is the perception and experience by the aforesaid Pro Se Appellant-Plaintiff, who has been rittled with corruption by abusive attorneys.
b) Judge Alayna Stone refused to acknowledge the numerous pre-trial documents, refused to have a trial, refused to even preside over the hearing at which she ruled on, which is all obvious judicial malpactice.
c) Contrary to the illegal eviction case, NHH-CV-6024198-S, as cited in Appellant’s Affidavit for Motion to Open, Paragraph 4(ii)(1) on Page 2 (satanically including “198” which has been the actual tenant portion of rent paid to this landlord for 5 years, to include after they were ordered by the court to remove their fraudulent $14,000 in charges, bringing back the balance to zero, as pointed out by the Appellant in court as well as in documentation) this same FAKE judge, Alayna Stone, allowed a Motion to Dismiss the Eviction to be heard, yet marked the trial to take place immediately following that hearing - showing deliberate intentions to deny the motion by the Plaintiff-Appellant before it was even heard. Yet in aforesaid case the woman who impersonated “Judge”: Stone claimed it was NECESSARY to have a hearing on Motion To Dismiss, and then ineptly allowing opportunity to state the complaint and hear the complaint - all of which was taken out of the transcript, which only covered 20 minutes of the over one-hour long hearing, at which time the Appellant-Plaintiff emphasized the Appellee-Defendants defaulted by not Answering the Complaint and defaulted by not appearing - not even realizing yet that the young man who was there was frauding his appearance as Attorney Peter Hoops who entered the BAR in 1987 before he was born, and was obviously his grandfather.
5. Though much more could be said on the obstruction of justice which occurred, the Appellant-Plaintiff is providing this emphasis as proof of the typical fraud made on court cases - all due to another pandora’s box opened when Appellant realized that cyber crime literally removed the Plaintiff’s Preliminary Statement stamped in by the court on October 23, 2024; and additionally an obvious CIA operative of many which the state injects into this government (which the State of Connecticut Government seems to rely on to get it out of debt due to mismanagement of the budget for numerous years) who referred to his or herself as Valery WormleyRadford (no hyphen, that person said) who uses an email of valerie.wormleyradford@ct.gov - calling the Appellant and telling her she has to cancel her food stamps hearing, that she was her social services worker. This obvious operative who had just learned just hours before that Appellant obtained the code and phone number to call for her hearing this coming week - which could only be achieved by spying on her phone and/or in her own apartment. The alleged worker never called before that, though the food stamps hearing request was made about 2 weeks ago This obvious operative claimed to be a social services worker who worked full time from home yet met people at the 2012-built multi-million dollar Social Services Building on Humphrey Street in New Haven - on Wednesdays and Thursdays from 8 am to 1 pm only. She refused to take court documents which were prepared and notarized, reflecting the harm caused to Appellant and costing a great deal of financial hardship to her already-impoverished state with a federal poverty level income since 2006, not even being provided the retroactive benefits in 2008. Appellant claimed she should be able to get more food stamps than that based on knowing what a few others receive. This obvious operative claimed that expenses were irrelevant to determining food stamps; that the only issue was income, and since her income was increased, the food stamps would be decreased even though the food stamps should have also been increased since the increase was based on Cost of Living Expenses. What was irrelevant to her is completely out of bounds. Assets and Expenses as well as size of household play a large part in determining how much food stamps an applicant receives. Certainly if they have a large inheritance, lost a spouse and received a large sum for life insurance, they are obviously in a much higher bracket than one who has had a federal poverty level income for years, even decades - due to being disabled from being head on by a state sander truck that was filled with sand on a sunny day with bare roads (as her own attorney criticized her for not getting out of his way so he could drive the opposite direction on the wrong side of a no - passing highway, and thus has undermined every attempt to achieve anything in life due to this underworld of corruption that supports sex trafficking, drug trafficking, and numerous other crimes which they enjoyed on Alpha Bay website - in the hijacked Deep Web - until Jeff Sessions and his collaborators took it down and requested Trump to provide military support to make an arrest sting of well over 20,000 people - sealed indictments were part of record in the federal court software - yet Trump only threatened to fire Jeff Sessions as Attorney General if he didn’t quit; that was Trump’s way of responding! This person who said their name was “Valerie” was unaware of real regulations and standards of practice and despite being a Friday, saying he/she were at home, ended the call with, “I need to end this call now. Another food stamp client is here waiting for me.”
6. The Preliminary Statement /To Court’s Declaratory Judgment, which is provided at pages 147-155 of the brief of the Appellant-Plaintiff on this appeal is referenced and the focal reason why this aforesaid Motion For Judcial Notice is being entered. Many more documents can be determined as missing if the Appellant just had her e-files. Yet they were stolen by the HOMELAND SECURITY contractors, as previously mentioned - reflecting organized crime within the US government - which is essentially common knowledge! It is stamped in, It was marked as being Document 118.00 because that was what it was presumably marked in the case information; yet a question mark was placed prior to submitting with the Appellant’s Brief or caused by cyber crime on the case information since it was uploaded with the brief. Nevertheless, the Docket was altered showing that the trial court literally removed this Preliminary Statement and altered the record through cyber crime. Possibly the document was intentionally not even uploaded, yet the housing clerks do their jobs fervently and responsibly and this took place by a cyber criminal at the wants of one or more court officials in the Judicial System, and obviously defended by the housing court officials.
7. The Docket of the Trial Court is appendixed for comparison on Page __. There is no entry for October 23, 2024 which reflects this Statement. There are additional references to documents, such as LAWS, which were also not entered on the case. Despite the wrongful abuse of process by the court, Appellant-Plaintiff made sure that all facts were entered and on the docket. She had every intent to appeal if necessary; stating this to the court - though the trial court ineptly denied her need for time to appeal. She therefore entered a Motion To Open due to order of nonsuit - and the court failed to hear it as required by statutory and caselaw - yet granted the fee waiver and simultaneously denied the Motion To Open without hearing it - which is reflective of dishonesty and deliberate violation of Due Process of Law, which has been consistently reflected in both this case as well as the illegal eviction case.
(a) The Motion To Open Judgement was entered with an affidavit. Rather than upload them together since the affidavit was part of the motion, the housing court separated them. Most likely this is a trick to enable the cyber criminals who “work” for the court to alter the record, remove documents which it wants to remove. The Motion To Open has been intercepted by cyber crime and does not fully reflect what the Appellant submitted originally.
b) This common could not be more evident when the Chief Clerk separated out the Appendix to the Complaint. The Appendix has thereafter been frauded! The Marshal gave the Secretary of State the Original deliberately, obviously to fraud! She claimed she had to give the Secretary of State her spare copy yet she had her OWN copy which was made for her and with all the other complaint packets, as validated by the Appellant herself.
a) The Secretary of State was given the orignal complaint, by the marshal serving it, since the trial court ordered it to be served by a marshal. This violated the Appellant-Plaintiff’s right to Due Process and resulted in the marshal getting a hefty check of almost $3,000. For serving four defendants at the same office owned by COLONIAL FOUNTAIN MANAGEMENT and two local offices (The Housing Authority and Livable City Initiative, also located in New Haven a half mile away) and going to Hartford to serve the Secretary of State, claiming to be agent for Bozzutos, which is an illegal agent - for over 12 years, and the marshal served the agent of service for MEPT Chapel despite the fact the Secretary of State altered the record and backdated it was dissolved, as it did for 360 State Street, Inc, which the marshal ALSO served - yet Hoops & Associates frauded their appearance and added them to the case when they obviously had no retainer since they were allegedly dissolved prior to that.
b) All documents pertainining to this are appendixed for emphasis, since it is the experience of this Appellant-Plaintiff that the court neither seeks to ensure Due Process and even though the Attorney’s Oath requires them to address fraudulent activity, it is completley disregarded instead.
8. This Motion For Judicial Notice will be accompanied by another motion, to deviate, since it has more than 10 pages and the Appendix begins with the page number following the last page of this motion - due to the fact that Appellant’s scanner has been vandalized and unplugged, unattached to her printer, and is no longer reliable to use until it is fixed. This will not be an easy task without having wifi in her apartment, except when she goes to her door - not knowing who may be in the hallway hacking her laptop as she uses it. Numerous CanoScan’s are listed in her settings, which may reflect that cyber criminals who invade her apartment set this up to hack her laptop - and possibly FBI pulled that plug when discovering her laptop was compromised using the scanner. She has great trust in FBI Agent William Aldenburg, having first met him in 2008. Yet she has no knowledge of what he does, let alone when he does it for his investigations. She was blocked from using the standard “360 State Street” internet access and thus, her security is particularly compromised using the “guest access”. Not only was Appellant’s router stolen from her in 2014 but the radiowave activity in this building has been life threatening and significant reflection of what has disrupted Appellant’s health (along with the fact her apartment has been vandalized frequently for at least 12 years, to include poisoning her food). She discovered this upon purchasing a meter at Home Depot, which cost $260. This meter was later stolen from her and she had to purchase another. The meter was obviously recovered by FBI and placed back in her apartment. She could not expect to receive any exchange or credit for it at that point and mailed it to a cyber friend who works diligently on informing the public on harmful radiowave activity which actually was why she purchased the meter. This landlord was ordered by a higher authority to ground many of its systems which surround the Appellant’s apartment - and thus proved this building was NOT being monitored for safe structural building code clearance by this city. Though Appellant purchased special curtains for one of her windows, which include traces of silver, she not only cannot afford to purchase them for her other window but also the ones she has purchased have been vandalized by illegal intruders. The cost of these curtains was almost $300.
LAW
The only law which this motion may have applied is PB 60-3 yet the Appellate Court has listed this Motion as an allowed motion of the court without defining the legal parameters. Printed laws are included in the
Appendix as supporting material of what has been argued at trial court.
CONCLUSION
This section has been precluded to keep this motion as close to ten pages as possible.
WHEREFORE, Appellant motions the court for Judicial Notice, dated April 1, 2026.
Appendix Attached, beginning with Page 24
Prepared and Submitted,
THE APPELLANT, PRO SE
_____IllegalEviction2024___
Anne M. Bradley
IllegalEviction2024
PO Box 206514
New Haven, CT 0652
Phone: 203-508-0858
CERTIFICATION
THIS MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE comprises of 23 pages,with Appendix, totalling 102 pages, date April 1, 2026, and is Pursuant to P.B. §§ 62-7 and 66-3, it is hereby certified that a copy of the foregoing was sent electronically this 1st day of April, 2026, to the following Attorneys who are listed by the Appellate Court:
Lloyd L. Langhammer (Appellate)
JURIS NO. Is oddly different than AC 48416 appearance
LAW OFFICES OF LLOYD L. LANGHAMMER, LLC
18A Granite Street
New London, CT 06320
860-440-3340
HOOPS & ASSOCIATES
19A THAMES STREET
GROTON, CT 06340
PHONE: 860-445-8911
FAX: 860-445-8919
LTKE LAW OFFICES
52 Trumbull Street
New Haven, CT 06510
203-787-0275
Fax: 203-401-3343
Bercham Moses
75 Broad Street
Milford, CT 06460
FAX: 203-878-2235
info@bmdlaw.com email on appearance was not revised and does not go through: lstilson@berchmoses.com
__IllegalEviction2024_
Anne M. Bradley, Pro Se
48452
NHH-CV24-5006875-S : APPELLATE COURT OF CT
ANNE M. BRADLEY : STATE OF CONNECTICUT
V : HOUSING SESSION
ANSONIA STATE
STREET, ET AL : MARCH 31, 2026
APPENDIX
MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
48452
NHH-CV24-5006875-S : APPELLATE COURT OF CT
ANNE M. BRADLEY : STATE OF CONNECTICUT
V : HOUSING SESSION
ANSONIA STATE
STREET, ET AL : MARCH 31, 2026
LAWS
Sec. 47a-7. Landlord's responsibilities. (a) A landlord shall: (1) Comply with the requirements of chapter 368 and all applicable building and housing codes materially affecting health and safety of both the state or any political subdivision thereof; (2) make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition, except where the premises are intentionally rendered unfit or uninhabitable by the tenant, a member of his family or other person on the premises with his consent, in which case such duty shall be the responsibility of the tenant; (3) keep all common areas of the premises in a clean and safe condition; (4) maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating and other facilities and appliances and elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him; (5) provide and maintain appropriate receptacles for the removal of ashes, garbage, rubbish and other waste incidental to the occupancy of the dwelling unit and arrange for their removal; and (6) supply running water and reasonable amounts of hot water at all times and reasonable heat except if the building which includes the dwelling unit is not required by law to be equipped for that purpose or if the dwelling unit is so constructed that heat or hot water is generated by an installation within the exclusive control of the tenant or supplied by a direct public utility connection.
(b) If any provision of any municipal ordinance, building code or fire code requires a greater duty of the landlord than is imposed under subsection (a) of this section, then such provision of such ordinance or code shall take precedence over the provision requiring such lesser duty in said subsection.
(c) The landlord and tenant of a single-family residence may agree in writing that the tenant perform the landlord's duties specified in subdivisions (5) and (6) of subsection (a) and also specified repairs, maintenance tasks, alterations, or remodeling, provided the transaction is entered into in good faith and not for the purpose of evading the obligations of the landlord.
(d) The landlord and tenant of a dwelling unit other than a single-family residence may agree that the tenant is to perform specified repairs, maintenance tasks, alterations or remodeling if (1) the agreement of the parties is entered into in good faith; (2) the agreement is in writing; (3) the work is not necessary to cure noncompliance with subdivisions (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of this section; and (4) the agreement does not diminish or affect the obligation of the landlord to other tenants in the premises.
(P.A. 76-95, S. 7, 27; 76-435, S. 75, 82; P.A. 77-451, S. 2; P.A. 79-571, S. 14; P.A. 80-235.)
History: P.A. 76-435 revised effective date section of P.A. 76-95; P.A. 77-451 substituted “or” for “and” preceding the word “supplied” in Subdiv. (6); P.A. 79-571 made technical grammatical corrections in Subsec. (a); P.A. 80-235 inserted new Subsec. (c) re agreements between landlord and tenant that tenant will perform landlord's duties, relettering former Subsec. (c) as (d) and specifying its applicability to dwelling units “other than a single family residence”.
Cited. 190 C. 552; 191 C. 484; 196 C. 591; 208 C. 161; Id., 620; 211 C. 501; 213 C. 354; 217 C. 57; 231 C. 923; 235 C. 360, see also 40 CA 219; 242 C. 236.
Cited. 4 CA 209; Id., 608; 10 CA 527; 12 CA 172; 13 CA 1; 16 CA 444; 31 CA 359; 32 CA 133; 35 CA 126; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 360; 40 CA 219; Id., 595; 42 CA 324; judgment reversed, see 242 C. 236; 43 CA 578; 45 CA 46.
Tenants may plead breach of implied warranty of habitability as special defense to action for summary process. 35 CS 233. Cited. 36 CS 47; Id., 611; 37 CS 873. Failure to install smoke detectors constitutes a material safety hazard and tenants are relieved of obligation to pay rent during period detectors not installed. 38 CS 67. Cited. Id., 393; Id., 683; 41 CS 283; 44 CS 544.
Subsec. (a):
Subdiv. (4): Standard set forth in Subdiv. clearly requires plaintiffs to show more than their dissatisfaction with the condition and operation of work completed. 213 CA 375.
Subdiv. (2): Intent of legislature was to make landlord's duty to maintain premises in a habitable condition dependent upon the covenant to pay rent; tenant was relieved of obligation to pay rent while her apartment was uninhabitable. 35 CS 151. Tenant's unilateral, self-serving declaration that conditions violate municipal codes is insufficient to meet burden of proof that conditions justify withholding rent. Id., 549. No provision in statute requires landlord to provide lawn and yard care; such expense is not necessary to keep premises “fit and habitable”. Id., 603.
FEE WAIVER PROCESSING BY SUPERIOR COURT
2024 Connecticut General Statutes
Title 52 - Civil Actions
Chapter 901 - Damages, Costs and Fees
Section 52-259. - Court fees.
Universal Citation:
CT Gen Stat § 52-259. (2024)
Learn moreThis media-neutral citation is based on the American Association of Law Libraries Universal Citation Guide and is not necessarily the official citation.
(a) There shall be paid to the clerks for entering each appeal or writ of error to the Supreme Court, or entering each appeal to the Appellate Court, as the case may be, two hundred fifty dollars, and for each civil cause in the Superior Court, three hundred sixty dollars, except (1) two hundred thirty dollars for entering each case in the Superior Court in which the sole claim for relief is damages and the amount, legal interest or property in demand is less than two thousand five hundred dollars; (2) one hundred seventy-five dollars for summary process and landlord and tenant actions; (3) there shall be no entry fee for making an application to the Superior Court for relief under section 46b-15 or 46b-16a, or for making an application to modify or extend an order issued pursuant to section 46b-15 or 46b-16a; (4) there shall be no entry fee for a civil action brought under section 53a-28a; and (5) there shall be no entry fee for a petition brought under subsection (f) of section 42a-9-518 and section 47-31a. If the amount, legal interest or property in demand by the plaintiff is alleged to be less than two thousand five hundred dollars, a new entry fee of seventy-five dollars shall be charged if the plaintiff amends his or her complaint to state that such demand is not less than two thousand five hundred dollars.
(b) The fee for the entry of a small claims case and for filing a counterclaim in a small claims case shall be ninety-five dollars. If a motion is filed to transfer a small claims case to the regular docket, the moving party shall pay a fee of one hundred twenty-five dollars.
(c) There shall be paid to the clerk of the Superior Court by any party who requests that a matter be designated as a complex litigation case the sum of three hundred thirty-five dollars, to be paid at the time the request is filed.
(d) unexpectedly missing - this section emphasizes right to fee waiver due to indigency
AS CITED ON THE FEE WAIVER FORM
PB 8-2:
Sec. 8-2. Waiver of Court Fees and Costs (a) Prior to the commencement of an action, or at any time during its pendency, a party may file with the clerk of the court in which the action is pending, or in which the party intends to return a writ, summons and complaint, an application for waiver of fees payable to the court and for payment by the state of the costs of service of process. The application shall set forth the facts which are the basis of the claim for waiver and for payment by the state of any costs of service of process; a statement of the applicant’s current income, expenses, assets and liabilities; pertinent records of employment, gross earnings, gross wages and all other income; and the specific fees and costs of service of process sought to be waived or paid by the state and the amount of each. The application and any representations shall be supported by an affidavit of the applicant to the truth of the facts recited. (b) The clerk with whom such an application is filed shall refer it to the court of which he or she is clerk. If the court finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees payable to the court or to pay the cost of service of process, the © Copyrighted by the Secretary of the State of the State of Connecticut Sec. 8-2 SUPERIOR COURT—PROCEDURE IN CIVIL MATTERS court shall waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by the state. (c) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process if (1) such person receives public assistance or (2) such person’s income after taxes, mandatory wage deductions and child care expenses is 125 percent or less of the federal poverty level. For purposes of this subsection, ‘‘public assistance’’ includes, but is not limited to, state administered general assistance, temporary family assistance, aid to persons who are elderly, persons who are blind or visually impaired or persons with disabilities, food stamps and supplemental security income. (d) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from (1) finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (c) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process, or (2) denying an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process when the court finds that (A) the applicant has repeatedly filed actions with respect to the same or similar matters, (B) such filings establish an extended pattern of frivolous filings that have been without merit, (C) the application sought is in connection with an action before the court that is consistent with the applicant’s previous pattern of frivolous filings, and (D) the granting of such application would constitute a flagrant misuse of Judicial Branch resources. If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application. Nothing in this section shall affect the inherent authority of the court to manage its docket. (P.B. 1978-1997, Sec. 50.) (Amended June 21, 2010, to take effect Jan. 1, 2011; amended June 13, 2014, to take effect Jan. 1, 2015; amended June 13, 2019, to take effect Jan. 1, 2020.)
PB 63-6
Sec. 63-6. Waiver of Fees, Costs and Security—Civil Cases If a party in any case where fees and costs may lawfully be waived is indigent and desires to appeal, that party may, within the time provided by the rules for taking an appeal, make written application to the trial court for relief from payment of fees, costs and expenses. The application must be under oath and recite, or it must be accompanied by an affidavit reciting, the grounds upon which the applicant proposes to appeal and the facts concerning the applicant’s financial status. Where an application arises out of a habeas corpus proceeding, the application shall be handled pursuant to Section 63-7. Where an application arises out of a child protection matter, the application shall be handled pursuant to Section 79a-4. The judicial authority shall act promptly on the application for waiver of fees, costs and expenses. If the application is denied in whole or in part, and the applicant wishes to challenge that denial, the applicant shall file a written request for a hearing, pursuant to Section 8-2, within ten days of the issuance of notice of the denial of the application. The clerk of the trial court shall assign the application for a hearing within twenty days of the filing of the request and the judicial authority shall act promptly on the application following the hearing. If the court is satisfied that the applicant is indigent and has a statutory or constitutional right to court appointed counsel or a statutory right to appeal without payment of fees, costs and expenses, the court may (1) waive payment by the applicant of fees specified by statute and of taxable costs, and (2) order that the necessary expenses of prosecuting the appeal be paid by the state. The court may not consider the relative merits of a proposed appeal in acting upon an application pursuant to this section except that the court may consider the criteria contained in General Statutes § 52-259b. Before incurring any expense in excess of $100, including the expense of obtaining a transcript of the necessary proceedings or testimony, the applicant shall obtain the permission of the judge who presided at the applicant’s trial. The judge shall authorize a transcript at state expense only of the portions of testimony or proceedings which may be pertinent to the issues on appeal. 467 The sole remedy of any party desiring the court to review an order concerning the waiver of fees, costs and security shall be by motion for review under Section 66-6. (P.B. 1978-1997, Sec. 4017.) (Amended July 21, 1999, to take effect Jan. 1, 2000; amended June 2, 2005, to take effect Jan. 1, 2006; amended June 18, 2014, to take effect Sept. 1, 2014; amended Sept. 16, 2015, to take effect Jan. 1, 2016.)
DUTIES OF CHIEF CLERK
Statutory Duties of a Connecticut Chief Clerk
(CGS § 51-52, 51-52a - repealed)
CHAPTER 873*
COURT CLERKS
*Cited. 36 CA 155.
Table of Contents
Note: Readers should refer to the 2024 Supplement, revised to January 1, 2024, for updated versions of statutes amended, repealed or added during the 2023 legislative sessions.
Sec. 51-52. General duties of clerks. (a) Clerks shall: (1) Receive the files, processes and documents returnable to their court locations, (2) make records of all proceedings required to be recorded, (3) have the custody of the active files and records of the court, (4) have the custody of the records of the former county court within their districts, (5) have the custody of and keep safely in the appropriate office, or store as provided in subsection (b) of this section, as records of the court, all judicial files, records and dockets belonging to or concerning the office of justices of the peace and trial justices, judges of borough, city, town and police courts, the traffic court of Danbury, the Circuit Court and the Court of Common Pleas, or belonging to or concerning such courts, including record books kept by town clerks under the provisions of sections 51-101 and 51-106 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, (6) make and keep dockets of causes in their court locations, (7) issue executions on judgments, (8) collect and receive all fines and forfeitures imposed or decreed by the court, including fines paid after commitment, (9) collect and receive monetary contributions made to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund pursuant to section 54-56h, (10) account for and pay or deposit all fees, fines, forfeitures and contributions made to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund and the proceeds of judgments of their office in the manner provided by sections 4-32 and 51-56a, and (11) perform all other duties imposed on them by law.
(b) Each clerk of court may store the inactive records of his court in any place of safekeeping designated by the Chief Court Administrator and may place the records in the direct custody of the records management officer or other designee of the Chief Court Administrator. The records management officer or designee shall be charged with the safekeeping of the records, and, when requested, may certify copies of the records.
(c) Temporary assistant clerks shall have the same duties as clerks of court.
(d) Each clerk for housing matters and the clerks for the judicial district of New Haven at Meriden shall supervise the handling of housing matters and the maintenance of court records relating thereto and shall provide assistance to pro se litigants and perform such other duties in connection with housing matters as the Chief Court Administrator or the judge assigned to hear the matters may assign to him.
(e) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes and except as otherwise ordered by the court or prescribed by the Chief Court Administrator, all funds in excess of a working balance established by the Chief Court Administrator held by a clerk of court in a fiduciary capacity shall be paid to the Treasurer or deposited in the Treasurer's accounts in depositories designated by the Treasurer in accordance with such regulations as the Treasurer prescribes. The Treasurer shall invest such funds in any manner he deems appropriate including, but not limited to, depositing the funds in public depositories and purchasing participation certificates in the Short-Term Investment Fund. If the court requests the return of all or a portion of such funds, the Treasurer shall return the amount of such funds requested to the court within two business days of the request. Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, all interest and earnings on funds paid to the Treasurer or deposited in the Treasurer's accounts pursuant to this subsection shall belong to and accrue to the benefit of the state.
(1949 Rev., S. 7718; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 172; 1963, P.A. 499; P.A. 74-183, S. 38, 291; P.A. 75-530, S. 5, 35; P.A. 76-436, S. 10a, 70, 681; P.A. 79-176, S. 1; P.A. 82-248, S. 51; 82-472, S. 134, 183; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-25, S. 3, 9; P.A. 84-162, S. 2; 84-262, S. 2; P.A. 92-239, S. 1, 3; P.A. 06-152, S. 7; P.A. 15-85, S. 8.)
History: 1959 act deleted reference to trial justice courts; 1963 act stipulated clerks have custody only of “active” files and added provision re storage of inactive records and records of mortgage foreclosures; P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas in provision re storage of records, reflecting transfer of circuit court functions to common pleas court, and specified that mortgage foreclosure records are to be stored in “deputy chief” clerk's office, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 75-530 amended section to apply to clerks generally, omitting specific references to clerks and deputy chief clerks of court of common pleas; P.A. 76-436 transferred duty to designate places of safekeeping from chief judge of court to chief court administrator, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 79-176 added provisions re placement of records in custody of a public officer or designee of chief court administrator and such person's responsibility for safekeeping of records and certifying copies of them; P.A. 82-248 reworded section, divided section into Subsecs. and added provisions formerly in Secs. 51-170 and 51-193a re custody of court records and Sec. 51-51v re duties of assistant clerk for housing matters; P.A. 82-472 deleted obsolete reference to court for the “county”; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-25 amended Subsec. (e) to include clerks for the judicial district of New Haven at Meriden; P.A. 84-162 deleted former Subsec. (c) which had required records of mortgage foreclosures to be stored in the office of the clerk of the court for the judicial district in which the land is located and redesignated former Subsec. (d) as Subsec. (c) and former Subsec. (e) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 84-262 amended newly designated Subsec. (d) by replacing “assistant clerk for housing matters” with “clerk for housing matters”; P.A. 92-239 added Subsec. (e) re deposit of fiduciary funds in the treasurer's accounts; P.A. 06-152 amended Subsec. (a) by adding new Subdiv. (9) re collection of monetary contributions made to Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund, redesignating existing Subdivs. (9) to (11) as Subdivs. (10) to (12), inserting provision re contributions made to Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund in redesignated Subdiv. (10) and making technical changes, effective July 1, 2006; P.A. 15-85 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting former Subdiv. (11) re filing of copies of memoranda of decisions in Superior Court cases with Reporter of Judicial Decisions and redesignating existing Subdiv. (12) re other duties as Subdiv. (11).
See Sec. 14-142 re proceedings against clerk who fails to deliver abstract of case to Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
Clerk of a court derives his authority to grant execution from the record; in the absence of a record he has no authority. 7 C. 9. In correcting a mistake, clerk acts in a ministerial capacity. Id., 141. Judicial record defined. 13 C. 217. An execution may be renewed by the clerk by changing its date. 17 C. 144. Clerks may at any time fill up blanks left for insertion of costs. 21 C. 526. Entries in dockets, not records. 25 C. 338. Contents of a judicial record. 27 C. 465, 466. Clerk should reenter cause on reversal of an order erasing it from the docket. 35 C. 103. Issuance of mittimus by clerk after term. 36 C. 251. Record of recognizance may be made from entries previously made on docket. 48 C. 375. Record speaks from date of fact recorded. 49 C. 82. General duties of clerk of Supreme Court. 70 C. 337. Functions in general. 84 C. 462. Delay in preparation of judgment file, while a breach of duty, does not invalidate it. 109 C. 243. Review of duties of clerks in connection with the keeping of records of the doings of their courts. Id., 241. Cited. 201 C. 1.
Cited. 15 CA 312; 16 CA 518; 31 CA 660.
Cited. 19 CS 41. Execution is within inherent equitable control of court and was denied where suit was pending to determine rights of defendant to subrogation to claim on which plaintiff's judgment was based. 27 CS 382. Cited. 28 CS 357; 42 CS 574.
With regard to judgment records of former minor courts, clerks of circuit court exercise duty of custody and safekeeping; they are not successors in office to clerks of said courts and are not enabled to amplify or complete any record of such courts in their custody; they may certify only to authenticity of documents in their custody, without verbal alteration. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 688. Issuance of execution ordinarily ministerial act. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 237.
Subsec. (b):
No authority is provided to allow court to create new file for considering an emergency motion or future related matters in withdrawn cases. 77 CA 690.
Sec. 51-52a. Powers of clerks and clerical assistants. (a) The clerk of any court may, when directed by the court, amend, make up and complete any imperfect or unfinished record in such manner as the court may direct.
(b) The clerk for each judicial district may certify to copies of the records and do all other acts in relation to the files and records of the county court which the clerk of the county court could have done and may, when directed by the superior court for such district, amend, make up and complete any record of the former county court, when necessary to supply any omission of a former clerk thereof, in such manner as the court directs.
(c) The chief clerk for each judicial district and the clerks for housing matters may certify, as clerk of the judicial district or of any county within or partly within the judicial district, to the authority of judges, justices of the peace and commissioners of the Superior Court.
(d) Deputy chief clerks, clerks, deputy clerks and assistant clerks shall have the same powers as chief clerks of the Superior Court, subject to the direction of the chief clerk, and shall be authorized clerks for the district for which they are appointed, for the purpose of certifying to the authority of any judge, justice of the peace or commissioner of the Superior Court. Deputy clerks and assistant clerks shall have the same powers as clerks of the superior court, subject to the direction of the clerk for the geographical area for which they are appointed, and shall be authorized clerks for the geographical area for the purpose of certifying to the authority of any judge, justice of the peace or commissioner of the Superior Court.
(e) A deputy chief clerk, deputy clerk or assistant clerk may sign any process or other document requiring the signature of the chief clerk or clerk for the court location for which he is appointed or any other document which the chief clerk or clerk is otherwise authorized to sign.
(f) A temporary assistant clerk shall have the same powers as clerks of the court.
(g) If authorized by the clerk, as defined in subsection (g) of section 51-51v, a supervisor or a clerical or administrative assistant may sign any process or other document requiring the signature of the chief clerk or clerk or any other document which the chief clerk or clerk is authorized to sign and may administer the oath to any witness during the trial or hearing of any action.
(P.A. 82-248, S. 52; P.A. 84-262, S. 3; P.A. 91-24, S. 4, 8.)
History: P.A. 84-262 amended Subsec. (c) by adding “and the clerks for housing matters”; P.A. 91-24 amended Subsec. (g) to replace “if authorized by the chief clerk or clerk for the court location for which he is appointed” with “If authorized by the clerk, as defined in subsection (g) of section 51-51v,” and to permit a supervisor when so authorized to sign certain documents and administer oaths.
Cited. 201 C. 1.
Cited. 16 CA 518.
Sec. 51-52b. (Formerly Sec. 51-171a). Certification re authority of justice of the peace or commissioner of the Superior Court in the judicial district of Bridgeport or Stamford-Norwalk. The chief clerk of the superior court at Bridgeport shall, on the request of any justice of the peace or commissioner of the Superior Court in the judicial district of Bridgeport or Stamford-Norwalk and on the receipt of a fee of one dollar, furnish to the chief clerk of the superior court at Stamford a duplicate of the certificate of qualification or appointment of such justice of the peace or commissioner of the Superior Court and said clerk at Stamford may thereafter certify to the authority of such justice of the peace or commissioner of the Superior Court.
(February, 1965, P.A. 601; P.A. 78-280, S. 7, 127; P.A. 80-201, S. 3, 9; P.A. 81-34, S. 6, 9; P.A. 23-46, S. 32.)
History: P.A. 78-280 replaced “Fairfield county” with “judicial district of Fairfield”; P.A. 80-201 applied provisions to judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk; P.A. 81-34 eliminated the authority of the clerk of the superior court at Bridgeport to certify authority of notaries public and specified that chief clerk empowered to certify the authority of justice of the peace or commissioners of the superior court, effective July 1, 1982; Sec. 51-171a transferred to Sec. 51-52b in 1983; P.A. 23-46 replaced judicial district of Fairfield with judicial district of Bridgeport, effective January 1, 2024.
Sec. 51-53. Clerks to give notice of decrees of court by mail or electronic delivery. (a) Whenever any court, including a court of probate, or the judge of any such court acting in any matter coming before him as a judge, makes or renders any decision, order, decree, denial or ruling, unless it is made or rendered in the presence of counsel in the matter, the clerk of the court shall immediately notify counsel and any appearing party, in writing by mail or electronic delivery, of the decision, order, decree, denial or ruling. Electronic delivery may be by computer or facsimile transmission or by employing other technology in accordance with procedures and technical standards established by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator or the Probate Court Administrator, as the case may be. Notice delivered electronically shall have the same validity and status as notice delivered by mail.
(b) The time limited by law for commencing appellate proceedings on the decision, order, decree, denial or ruling shall date from the time when such notice is issued by the clerk.
(1949 Rev., S. 7719; 1963, P.A. 412; P.A. 82-248, S. 53; P.A. 12-133, S. 6.)
History: 1963 act deleted prohibition against applying section to courts or judges of probate, specifying section to apply in any contested matter; P.A. 82-248 rephrased section and divided section into Subsecs.; P.A. 12-133 amended Subsec. (a) by adding provisions re clerk to provide notice to any appearing party, re notice given by mail or electronic delivery, re methods and standards for electronic delivery and re delivery of notice electronically to have same validity as notice delivered by mail.
See Sec. 45a-187 re time of taking probate appeals.
Cited. 132 C. 627; 178 C. 189; 181 C. 367; 232 C. 181.
Cited. 36 CA 469; 44 CA 812; 45 CA 324; 46 CA 298.
Section applied. 31 CS 53.
Subsec. (a):
Clerk's failure to issue notice of an order does not render the order ineffective. 131 CA 471.
Sec. 51-54. Completing records. Section 51-54 is repealed.
(1949 Rev., S. 7720; P.A. 82-248, S. 163.)
Sec. 51-55. Judgments of default or nonsuit. A clerk of the Superior Court shall not enter any judgment of default or nonsuit, unless directed by the court, except where the parties fail to appear; provided, in any civil action in which a notice of an intention to suffer a default has been filed, the clerk shall, upon request of either party, enter judgment of default.
(1949 Rev., S. 7700; P.A. 82-160, S. 101.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased section, but made no substantive changes.
See Sec. 52-84 re time for rendering judgment by default.
Failure of defendant to receive notice does not relieve her of blame in failing to enter her appearance. 139 C. 532.
Cited. 17 CS 118.
Sec. 51-51w. (Formerly Sec. 51-12a). Collection of fees by clerks. Expenses.
Sec. 51-52. General duties of clerks.
Sec. 51-52a. Powers of clerks and clerical assistants.
Sec. 51-53. Clerks to give notice of decrees of court by mail or electronic delivery.
Sec. 51-54. Completing records.
Sec. 51-55. Judgments of default or nonsuit.
Sec. 51-57. Superior Court clerks. Oath. Full-time duties. Criminal defense prohibited.
Sec. 51-58. Court seals. Filing of official seals with Secretary of the State.
Sec. 51-59. Clerks' offices, when open.
Sec. 51-51v. (Formerly Sec. 51-168). Appointment of chief clerks and assistants. Clerk for Centralized Infractions Bureau. Clerks for housing matters. (a) The judges of the Superior Court, at their annual meeting in June, shall appoint: (1) Chief clerks for the judicial districts; (2) deputy chief clerks for those judicial districts designated by an authorized committee of the judges; (3) first assistant clerks for those judicial districts designated by an authorized committee of the judges; (4) clerks for the geographical areas; (5) a clerk for the Centralized Infractions Bureau; and (6) clerks for housing matters, including a chief clerk for housing matters.
(b) The judges of the Superior Court or an authorized committee thereof shall appoint, as is deemed necessary for the efficient operation of the courts, (1) assistant clerks for judicial districts and geographical areas and (2) deputy clerks for those geographical areas designated by the judges of the Superior Court or an authorized committee thereof.
(c) A judge holding a session of the Superior Court may, if he deems it necessary, appoint a temporary assistant clerk or clerks for the Superior Court. A temporary assistant clerk shall hold office for such time as is deemed necessary for the convenient conduct of the business of the court in which he was appointed and may at any time be discharged by the order of the senior acting judge holding court in the district for which he was appointed.
(d) The judges of the Superior Court or an authorized committee of Superior Court judges may, in their discretion, appoint such administrative and clerical personnel as the business of the court requires.
(e) The judges or an authorized committee thereof may fill any vacancy which may occur in the clerks' offices.
(f) The Chief Court Administrator may assign, reassign or modify the assignment of such clerical personnel as he deems necessary for the efficient operation of the courts.
(g) Whenever the word “clerk” is used in the general statutes to mean the clerk of the Superior Court, it shall, except with respect to compensation, be construed to include any chief clerk, deputy chief clerk, deputy clerk, assistant clerk of the court and the clerk of the Centralized Infractions Bureau unless the context otherwise requires.
(1949 Rev., S. 7662, 7663; June, 1955, S. 3132d; 1957, P.A. 445, S. 7; 1963, P.A. 394, S. 2; 1972, P.A. 165, S. 3; June, 1972, P.A. 1, S. 20; P.A. 73-72, S. 1, 2; P.A. 76-436, S. 10a, 36, 681; P.A. 77-576, S. 18, 65; P.A. 78-365, S. 4, 13; 78-379, S. 5, 27; P.A. 79-503, S. 1, 3; P.A. 80-201, S. 1, 9; 80-448, S. 4, 8; P.A. 81-419, S. 6, 11; P.A. 82-248, S. 48; 82-461, S. 5, 15; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-25, S. 1, 9; P.A. 84-262, S. 1; 84-441, S. 1, 4; 84-529, S. 1; P.A. 85-414, S. 1, 5; 85-446, S. 1, 6; P.A. 86-403, S. 83, 132; P.A. 87-262, S. 1.)
History: 1963 act authorized assistant clerks to sign process or other documents; 1972 acts included clerks for the judicial district of Waterbury, effective September 5, 1972; P.A. 73-72 required biennial rather than annual appointment of clerks; P.A. 76-436 returned to annual appointment of clerks, clarified appointments to be made by replacing requirement for appointments for each county, judicial district of Waterbury and court at Stamford with provisions of Subdivs. (a) to (e), deleted provision whereby any judge could fill vacancy in office of assistant clerk until next annual meeting of judges or until appointee removed by a special meeting of judges, classified clerks as chief clerks, deputy chief clerks, clerks, deputy clerks and assistant clerks rather than as clerks and assistant clerks, added provision re powers of clerical or administrative assistants, defined “clerk” and authorized chief court administrator to assign, reassign or modify assignment of clerical personnel, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 51-168 transferred to Sec. 51-51v in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement; P.A. 77-576 replaced references to specific counties with references to their replacement judicial districts and deleted general references to counties or substituted “judicial districts” for them as necessary, effective July l, 1978; P.A. 78-365 provided for appointment of chief clerk at Bridgeport and at Stamford for Fairfield judicial district and added provisions re appointment and duties of assistant clerk for housing matters in judicial district of Hartford-New Britain, effective December 1, 1978; P.A. 78-379 reiterated amendment of P.A. 78-365 re appointment of clerks for Fairfield judicial district; P.A. 79-503 added exception re number of clerks for the geographical area including Hartford in Subdiv. (c); P.A. 80-201 deleted provisions re appointment of chief clerk at Bridgeport and at Stamford and appointment of deputy chief clerk “at Bridgeport” for Fairfield judicial district; P.A. 80-448 made position of assistant clerk for housing matters permanent, removing provision whereby said clerk was to serve for 19 months beginning December 1, 1978; P.A. 81-419 increased the number of assistant clerks appointed for housing matters from one to two and provided for the appointment of clerk for the judicial district of New Haven; P.A. 82-248 rephrased and reorganized section, divided section into Subsecs., inserted provisions formerly in Sec. 51-27b re appointment of assistant clerks and clerical personnel, deleted provisions concerning duties of housing clerks and reenacted such provisions as part of Sec. 51-52, deleted provisions concerning the powers of deputy and assistant clerks and reenacted such provisions as part of Sec. 51-52a and deleted a provision concerning the oaths of clerks and reenacted it as part of Sec. 51-57; P.A. 82-461 provided for the appointment of an assistant clerk for housing matters for each of the judicial districts of Fairfield, Waterbury and Stamford-Norwalk; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-25 amended Subsec. (a) to provide for the appointment of a chief clerk at New Haven and at Meriden in the judicial district of New Haven and to specify that the assistant clerks for housing matters in the judicial district of New Haven serve “at New Haven”; P.A. 84-262 amended Subsec. (a) to change the name of “assistant clerks for housing matters” to “clerks for housing matters”, to reduce the number of clerks for housing matters for the New Haven judicial district from two to one and to provide for the appointment of one clerk to serve as chief clerk for housing matters and to clarify that housing clerks were to be appointed at judges' annual meeting in June; P.A. 84-441 provided for the appointment of a deputy chief clerk for the Stamford-Norwalk judicial district; P.A. 84-529 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting language requiring annual appointment of assistant clerks by judges of the superior court at their annual meeting in June; P.A. 85-414 amended Subsec. (a) to include a chief clerk at New London and at Norwich in the judicial district of New London, effective December 2, 1985, upon certification of the chief court administrator that courthouse at New London is operational; P.A. 85-446 included clerk for the centralized infractions bureau in appointment provisions and in definition of “clerk”, effective October 1, 1986; P.A. 86-403 revised effective date of P.A. 85-414 but without affecting this section; P.A. 87-262 amended Subsec. (a) to replace provisions concerning the appointment of specific numbers of clerks for specific locations with general provisions concerning the appointment of clerks and to authorize the appointment of first assistant clerks, designated as Subsec. (b) provisions derived from former Subsec. (a) re appointment of assistant clerks and deputy clerks, deleted former Subsec. (b) re appointment of clerks and assistant clerks to be located at each office of the superior court and the staffing of such offices with other clerical personnel, amended Subsec. (d) to change clerical “assistants” to clerical “personnel” and amended Subsec. (e) to delete provision authorizing the judges or a committee to remove any clerk or administrative or clerical assistant.
See Sec. 3-96 re list of Superior Court judges and officials kept by Secretary of the State.
See Sec. 51-57 re court clerks' oath, duties, etc.
See Sec. 51-166 re annual meeting of Superior Court judges.
See Sec. 51-201 re appointment of chief clerk of Supreme Court.
Annotations to former section 51-168:
General duties of clerk of Supreme Court. 70 C. 337. In absence of clerk, his assistant is the clerk; 80 C. 619; he may allow an appeal. 83 C. 136. Act of clerk as act of court; established usage as justifying. 84 C. 458.
Annotation to present section:
Cited. 193 C. 670.
Sec. 51-51w. (Formerly Sec. 51-12a). Collection of fees by clerks. Expenses. All fees payable by statute to clerks of the Superior Court shall belong to the state and shall be collected by them for its use. The Superior Court, or any judge thereof, may tax in favor of the clerks such sums for expenses and assistance as may be necessary for the maintenance of the courts.
(P.A. 73-635, S. 3; P.A. 74-183, S. 60, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 38, 681; P.A. 77-576, S. 19, 48, 65; P.A. 78-377, S. 2, 4; P.A. 79-420, S. 1, 2; P.A. 80-201, S. 2, 9; 80-331, S. 1, 3; P.A. 82-248, S. 49; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-25, S. 2, 9; P.A. 84-441, S. 2, 4; P.A. 85-414, S. 2, 5; P.A. 86-403, S. 83, 132; P.A. 87-262, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 74-183 included deputy chief clerks of common pleas court in their respective salary categories and established chief clerk of common pleas court as salary group 31, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 amended section to remove distinctions between common pleas and superior court clerks and to remove provision re salary of chief clerk of common pleas court, reflecting transfer of common pleas court functions to superior court, and added provision re salary of chief clerk for judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 51-12a transferred to Sec. 51-51w in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement; P.A. 77-576 amended section to refer to judicial districts rather than counties and to raise salary groups in all cases by two levels, except that chief clerk of Ansonia-Milford judicial district rose from salary group 27 to group 31 and chief clerk for Litchfield judicial district rose from group 28 to group 31, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 78-377 changed effective date of P.A. 77-576, S. 48 from July 1, 1978, to January 1, 1979; P.A. 79-420 raised salary group for chief clerk of Hartford-New Britain judicial district from 27 to 31, effective June 12, 1979, and retroactive to January 1, 1979; P.A. 80-201 replaced chief clerk of judicial district of Fairfield with chief clerk of judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk in salary group 32; P.A. 80-331 raised chief clerks of New Haven and Fairfield from group 33 to group 35 and deputy chief clerks for those districts from group 32 to group 33 and included chief clerk for judicial district of Danbury in group 31; P.A. 82-248 reworded section, divided section into Subsecs. and added provisions formerly in Sec. 51-169 re salaries and traveling expenses of clerks and assistant clerks and collection of fees by clerks; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-25 amended Subsec. (a)(4) to include the chief clerk for the judicial district of New Haven at Meriden in salary group 31; P.A. 84-441 included the deputy chief clerk for the Stamford-Norwalk judicial district in salary group 30; P.A. 85-414 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting references to assistant clerks and included the chief clerk for the judicial district of New London at New London in salary group 31, effective December 2, 1985, upon certification by chief court administrator that courthouse at New London is operational; P.A. 86-403 revised effective date of P.A. 85-414 but without affecting this section; P.A. 87-262 deleted former Subsec. (a) re specific salary groups for the chief clerks and deputy chief clerks for the various judicial districts and court locations, deleted former Subsec. (b) re the salaries of the clerks and their assistants being in lieu of any other compensation for services required of them by law, and deleted former Subsec. (d) re receipt by clerks and assistant clerks of traveling expenses.
Secs. 51-51x and 51-51y. Continuation of service of persons serving in Superior Court, Court of Common Pleas and Juvenile Court on June 30, 1978. Term of office of persons appointed July 1, 1977. Sections 51-51x and 51-51y are repealed.
(P.A. 76-436, S. 10a, 36a, 37, 681; P.A. 78-280, S. 75, 127; P.A. 82-248, S. 163.)
Sec. 51-52. General duties of clerks. (a) Clerks shall: (1) Receive the files, processes and documents returnable to their court locations, (2) make records of all proceedings required to be recorded, (3) have the custody of the active files and records of the court, (4) have the custody of the records of the former county court within their districts, (5) have the custody of and keep safely in the appropriate office, or store as provided in subsection (b) of this section, as records of the court, all judicial files, records and dockets belonging to or concerning the office of justices of the peace and trial justices, judges of borough, city, town and police courts, the traffic court of Danbury, the Circuit Court and the Court of Common Pleas, or belonging to or concerning such courts, including record books kept by town clerks under the provisions of sections 51-101 and 51-106 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, (6) make and keep dockets of causes in their court locations, (7) issue executions on judgments, (8) collect and receive all fines and forfeitures imposed or decreed by the court, including fines paid after commitment, (9) collect and receive monetary contributions made to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund pursuant to section 54-56h, (10) account for and pay or deposit all fees, fines, forfeitures and contributions made to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund and the proceeds of judgments of their office in the manner provided by sections 4-32 and 51-56a, and (11) perform all other duties imposed on them by law.
(b) Each clerk of court may store the inactive records of his court in any place of safekeeping designated by the Chief Court Administrator and may place the records in the direct custody of the records management officer or other designee of the Chief Court Administrator. The records management officer or designee shall be charged with the safekeeping of the records, and, when requested, may certify copies of the records.
(c) Temporary assistant clerks shall have the same duties as clerks of court.
(d) Each clerk for housing matters and the clerks for the judicial district of New Haven at Meriden shall supervise the handling of housing matters and the maintenance of court records relating thereto and shall provide assistance to pro se litigants and perform such other duties in connection with housing matters as the Chief Court Administrator or the judge assigned to hear the matters may assign to him.
(e) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes and except as otherwise ordered by the court or prescribed by the Chief Court Administrator, all funds in excess of a working balance established by the Chief Court Administrator held by a clerk of court in a fiduciary capacity shall be paid to the Treasurer or deposited in the Treasurer's accounts in depositories designated by the Treasurer in accordance with such regulations as the Treasurer prescribes. The Treasurer shall invest such funds in any manner he deems appropriate including, but not limited to, depositing the funds in public depositories and purchasing participation certificates in the Short-Term Investment Fund. If the court requests the return of all or a portion of such funds, the Treasurer shall return the amount of such funds requested to the court within two business days of the request. Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, all interest and earnings on funds paid to the Treasurer or deposited in the Treasurer's accounts pursuant to this subsection shall belong to and accrue to the benefit of the state.
(1949 Rev., S. 7718; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 172; 1963, P.A. 499; P.A. 74-183, S. 38, 291; P.A. 75-530, S. 5, 35; P.A. 76-436, S. 10a, 70, 681; P.A. 79-176, S. 1; P.A. 82-248, S. 51; 82-472, S. 134, 183; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-25, S. 3, 9; P.A. 84-162, S. 2; 84-262, S. 2; P.A. 92-239, S. 1, 3; P.A. 06-152, S. 7; P.A. 15-85, S. 8.)
History: 1959 act deleted reference to trial justice courts; 1963 act stipulated clerks have custody only of “active” files and added provision re storage of inactive records and records of mortgage foreclosures; P.A. 74-183 replaced circuit court with court of common pleas in provision re storage of records, reflecting transfer of circuit court functions to common pleas court, and specified that mortgage foreclosure records are to be stored in “deputy chief” clerk's office, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 75-530 amended section to apply to clerks generally, omitting specific references to clerks and deputy chief clerks of court of common pleas; P.A. 76-436 transferred duty to designate places of safekeeping from chief judge of court to chief court administrator, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 79-176 added provisions re placement of records in custody of a public officer or designee of chief court administrator and such person's responsibility for safekeeping of records and certifying copies of them; P.A. 82-248 reworded section, divided section into Subsecs. and added provisions formerly in Secs. 51-170 and 51-193a re custody of court records and Sec. 51-51v re duties of assistant clerk for housing matters; P.A. 82-472 deleted obsolete reference to court for the “county”; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-25 amended Subsec. (e) to include clerks for the judicial district of New Haven at Meriden; P.A. 84-162 deleted former Subsec. (c) which had required records of mortgage foreclosures to be stored in the office of the clerk of the court for the judicial district in which the land is located and redesignated former Subsec. (d) as Subsec. (c) and former Subsec. (e) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 84-262 amended newly designated Subsec. (d) by replacing “assistant clerk for housing matters” with “clerk for housing matters”; P.A. 92-239 added Subsec. (e) re deposit of fiduciary funds in the treasurer's accounts; P.A. 06-152 amended Subsec. (a) by adding new Subdiv. (9) re collection of monetary contributions made to Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund, redesignating existing Subdivs. (9) to (11) as Subdivs. (10) to (12), inserting provision re contributions made to Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund in redesignated Subdiv. (10) and making technical changes, effective July 1, 2006; P.A. 15-85 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting former Subdiv. (11) re filing of copies of memoranda of decisions in Superior Court cases with Reporter of Judicial Decisions and redesignating existing Subdiv. (12) re other duties as Subdiv. (11).
See Sec. 14-142 re proceedings against clerk who fails to deliver abstract of case to Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.
Clerk of a court derives his authority to grant execution from the record; in the absence of a record he has no authority. 7 C. 9. In correcting a mistake, clerk acts in a ministerial capacity. Id., 141. Judicial record defined. 13 C. 217. An execution may be renewed by the clerk by changing its date. 17 C. 144. Clerks may at any time fill up blanks left for insertion of costs. 21 C. 526. Entries in dockets, not records. 25 C. 338. Contents of a judicial record. 27 C. 465, 466. Clerk should reenter cause on reversal of an order erasing it from the docket. 35 C. 103. Issuance of mittimus by clerk after term. 36 C. 251. Record of recognizance may be made from entries previously made on docket. 48 C. 375. Record speaks from date of fact recorded. 49 C. 82. General duties of clerk of Supreme Court. 70 C. 337. Functions in general. 84 C. 462. Delay in preparation of judgment file, while a breach of duty, does not invalidate it. 109 C. 243. Review of duties of clerks in connection with the keeping of records of the doings of their courts. Id., 241. Cited. 201 C. 1.
Cited. 15 CA 312; 16 CA 518; 31 CA 660.
Cited. 19 CS 41. Execution is within inherent equitable control of court and was denied where suit was pending to determine rights of defendant to subrogation to claim on which plaintiff's judgment was based. 27 CS 382. Cited. 28 CS 357; 42 CS 574.
With regard to judgment records of former minor courts, clerks of circuit court exercise duty of custody and safekeeping; they are not successors in office to clerks of said courts and are not enabled to amplify or complete any record of such courts in their custody; they may certify only to authenticity of documents in their custody, without verbal alteration. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 688. Issuance of execution ordinarily ministerial act. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 237.
Subsec. (b):
No authority is provided to allow court to create new file for considering an emergency motion or future related matters in withdrawn cases. 77 CA 690.
024 Connecticut General Statutes
Title 51 - Courts
Chapter 883 - Supreme Court
Section 51-201. - Chief clerk of the Supreme Court.
Universal Citation:
CT Gen Stat § 51-201. (2024)
Learn moreThis media-neutral citation is based on the American Association of Law Libraries Universal Citation Guide and is not necessarily the official citation.
The judges of the Supreme Court shall appoint a chief clerk of the Supreme Court who shall not be a chief clerk of any judicial district. The chief clerk of the Supreme Court shall also be the chief clerk of the Appellate Court.
(1949 Rev., S. 7684; P.A. 82-248, S. 103; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 65, 82; P.A. 12-133, S. 13.)
History: P.A. 82-248 substituted “judicial district” for “county”; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 rewrote section, providing for appointment of a chief clerk of the supreme court by justices of the supreme court and providing that such chief clerk shall also be the chief clerk of the appellate court; P.A. 12-133 substituted “judges” for “justices”, effective July 1, 2012.
Who are such clerks; duties. 70 C. 337.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Chapter 895 Secs. 52-1 to 52-45 | |
Chapter 896 Secs. 52-45a to 52-72 | |
Chapter 897 Secs. 52-73 to 52-88 | |
Chapter 898 Secs. 52-89 to 52-142 | |
Chapter 899 Secs. 52-143 to 52-184e | |
Chapter 900 Secs. 52-185 to 52-235f | |
Chapter 901 Secs. 52-236 to 52-262 | |
Chapter 902 Secs. 52-263 to 52-269 | |
Chapter 903 Secs. 52-270 to 52-278 | |
Chapter 903a Secs. 52-278a to 52-278n | |
Chapter 904 Secs. 52-279 to 52-328 | |
Chapter 905 Secs. 52-329 to 52-346 | |
Chapter 906 Secs. 52-347 to 52-400f | |
Chapter 907 Secs. 52-401 to 52-405 | |
Chapter 908 Secs. 52-406 to 52-407 | |
Chapter 909 Secs. 52-407aa to 52-424 | |
Chapter 910 Secs. 52-425 to 52-434d | |
Chapter 911 Secs. 52-435 to 52-445 | Paternity Proceedings (See Chapter 815y) |
Chapter 912 Secs. 52-446 to 52-455 | |
Chapter 913 Secs. 52-456 to 52-461 | |
Chapter 914 Secs. 52-462 to 52-465 | Forcible Entry and Detainer (See Chapter 833) |
Chapter 915 Secs. 52-466 to 52-470 | |
Chapter 916 Secs. 52-471 to 52-483 | |
Chapter 917 Sec. 52-484 | |
Chapter 918 Secs. 52-485 to 52-494 | |
Chapter 919 Secs. 52-495 to 52-503r | |
Chapter 920 Secs. 52-504 to 52-514 | |
Chapter 921 Secs. 52-515 to 52-531 | |
Chapter 922 Secs. 52-532 to 52-549 | Summary Process (See Chapter 832) |
Chapter 922a Secs. 52-549a to 52-549m | |
Chapter 922b Secs. 52-549n to 52-549aa | |
Chapter 923 Secs. 52-550 to 52-551 | |
Chapter 923a Secs. 52-552 to 52-552l | |
Chapter 924 Secs. 52-553 to 52-554 | |
Chapter 925 Secs. 52-555 to 52-572x | |
Chapter 926 Secs. 52-573 to 52-598a | |
Chapter 927 Secs. 52-599 to 52-603 | |
Chapter 928 Secs. 52-604 to 52-609 | |
Chapter 929 Secs. 52-610 to 52-618 | Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (See Chapter 861) |
Chapter 930 Secs. 52-619 to 52-654 | |
Chapter 931 Secs. 52-655 to 52-660 |
CHAPTER 922
SUMMARY PROCESS
Table of Contents
Note: Readers should refer to the 2026 Supplement, revised to January 1, 2026, for updated versions of statutes amended, repealed or added during the 2025 legislative sessions.
Secs. 52-532 to 52-549. Transferred
Secs. 52-532 to 52-549. Transferred to Chapter 832, Secs. 47a-23 to 47a-42, inclusive.
CHAPTER 832*
SUMMARY PROCESS
*Cited. 209 C. 243; 217 C. 57.
Cited. 13 CA 1; 19 CA 564; 21 CA 40; 23 CA 366; 36 CA 432.
Cited. 38 CS 70.
Table of Contents
Note: Readers should refer to the 2026 Supplement, revised to January 1, 2026, for updated versions of statutes amended, repealed or added during the 2025 legislative sessions.
Sec. 47a-23c. Prohibition on eviction of certain tenants except for good cause.
Sec. 47a-23d. Report to General Assembly.
Sec. 47a-24. (Formerly Sec. 52-532a). Action by cooperative housing corporation.
Sec. 47a-24a. Action by receiver of rents.
Sec. 47a-25. (Formerly Sec. 52-533). Waiver of notice to quit.
Sec. 47a-26. (Formerly Sec. 52-534). Failure to appear. Judgment.
Sec. 47a-26a. Failure to plead. Judgment.
Sec. 47a-26b. Motion and order for payments for use and occupancy.
Sec. 47a-26c. Advancement of pleadings. Failure to plead.
Sec. 47a-26d. Trial. Finding. Judgment.
Sec. 47a-26e. Order of payments on appeal.
Sec. 47a-26f. Hearing to distribute payments.
Sec. 47a-26h. Persons bound by judgment. Notice. Exemption.
Sec. 47a-26i. Motion to open or set aside judgment or to extend final stay of execution.
Sec. 47a-26j. Records of summary process actions.
Sec. 47a-27. (Formerly Sec. 52-535). Summary process by assignee and mortgagee.
Sec. 47a-28. (Formerly Sec. 52-536). Action by selectmen.
Sec. 47a-29. (Formerly Sec. 52-537). Action by reversion or remainderman.
Sec. 47a-31. (Formerly Sec. 52-539). Illegal use of premises voids lease.
Sec. 47a-32. (Formerly Sec. 52-540). Nuisance defined.
Sec. 47a-33. (Formerly Sec. 52-540a). Defense that action is retaliatory.
Sec. 47a-33a. Presentation of affirmative defenses.
Sec. 47a-34. (Formerly Sec. 52-541). Other legal remedies not affected.
Sec. 47a-35. (Formerly Sec. 52-542). Stay of execution. Appeal.
Sec. 47a-35b. Distribution of payments after appeal.
Sec. 47a-37. (Formerly Sec. 52-544). Application for stay of execution.
Sec. 47a-38. (Formerly Sec. 52-545). Hearing on application for stay of execution.
Sec. 47a-39. (Formerly Sec. 52-546). Court may grant stay of execution.
Sec. 47a-40. (Formerly Sec. 52-547). No entry fee, judgment fee or costs on application or hearing.
Sec. 47a-41. (Formerly Sec. 52-548). Waiver of tenant's rights to be void.
Sec. 47a-41a. Execution void after six months.
NOTICE TO QUIT WAS INVALID
Sec. 47a-23a. Complaint. (a) If, at the expiration of the three days prescribed in section 47a-23, the lessee or occupant neglects or refuses to quit possession or occupancy of the premises, any commissioner of the Superior Court may issue a writ, summons and complaint which shall be in the form and nature of an ordinary writ, summons and complaint in a civil process, but which shall set forth facts justifying a judgment for immediate possession or occupancy of the premises and make a claim for possession or occupancy of the premises.
Sec. 47a-23c. Prohibition on eviction of certain tenants except for good cause. (a)(1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, this section applies to any tenant who resides in a building or complex consisting of five or more separate dwelling units or who resides in a mobile manufactured home park and who is either: (A) Sixty-two years of age or older, or whose spouse, sibling, parent or grandparent is sixty-two years of age or older and permanently resides with that tenant, or (B) a person with a physical or mental disability, as defined in subdivision (12) of section 46a-64b, or whose spouse, sibling, child, parent or grandparent is a person with a physical or mental disability who permanently resides with that tenant, but only if such disability can be expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months.
(b) (1) No landlord may bring an action of summary process or other action to dispossess a tenant described in subsection (a) of this section except for one or more of the following reasons: (A) Nonpayment of rent; (B) refusal to agree to a fair and equitable rent increase, as defined in subsection (c) of this section; (C) material noncompliance with section 47a-11 or subsection (b) of section 21-82, which materially affects the health and safety of the other tenants or which materially affects the physical condition of the premises; (D) voiding of the rental agreement pursuant to section 47a-31, or material noncompliance with the rental agreement; (E) material noncompliance with the rules and regulations of the landlord adopted in accordance with section 47a-9 or 21-70; (F) permanent removal by the landlord of the dwelling unit of such tenant from the housing market; or (G) bona fide intention by the landlord to use such dwelling unit as his principal residence.
(2) The ground stated in subparagraph (G) of subdivision (1) of this subsection is not available to the owner of a dwelling unit in a common interest community occupied by a conversion tenant.
(3) A tenant may not be dispossessed for a reason described in subparagraph (B), (F) or (G) of subdivision (1) of this subsection during the term of any existing rental agreement.
Sec. 47a-25. (Formerly Sec. 52-533). Waiver of notice to quit. When, in any written lease of any land, building, apartment or dwelling unit, notice to quit possession has been expressly waived by the lessee in the event such lease terminates by lapse of time, the three days' notice prescribed in sections 47a-23 and 47a-23a shall not be necessary; and complaint and summons may issue in the same manner as if such notice to quit had been previously given.
2024 Connecticut General Statutes
Title 52 - Civil Actions
Chapter 901 - Damages, Costs and Fees
Section 52-259b. - Waiver of fees and payment of the cost of service of process for indigent party.
Universal Citation:
CT Gen Stat § 52-259b. (2024)
Learn moreThis media-neutral citation is based on the American Association of Law Libraries Universal Citation Guide and is not necessarily the official citation.
(a) In any civil or criminal matter, if the court finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees payable to the court or to pay the cost of service of process, the court shall waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by the state.
(b) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process if (1) such person receives public assistance, or (2) such person's income after taxes, mandatory wage deductions and child care expenses is one hundred twenty-five per cent or less of the federal poverty level. For purposes of this subsection, “public assistance” includes, but is not limited to, state-administered general assistance, temporary family assistance, aid to the aged, blind and disabled, supplemental nutrition assistance and Supplemental Security Income.
(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from (1) finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process, or (2) denying an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process when the court finds that (A) the applicant has repeatedly filed actions with respect to the same or similar matters, (B) such filings establish an extended pattern of frivolous filings that have been without merit, (C) the application sought is in connection with an action before the court that is consistent with the applicant's previous pattern of frivolous filings, and (D) the granting of such application would constitute a flagrant misuse of Judicial Branch resources. If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application. Nothing in this section shall affect the inherent authority of the court to manage its docket.
(d) Any person aggrieved by a decision, after hearing, denying an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee for the cost of commencing a civil action or habeas action in the Superior Court or the cost of service of process for commencing such an action in the Superior Court may file a petition to the Appellate Court for review of such order. There shall be no fee required for the filing of such a petition.
(Nov. Sp. Sess. P.A. 81-4, S. 28, 32; P.A. 82-325, S. 3, 7; P.A. 90-261, S. 14, 19; P.A. 99-119; P.A. 04-76, S. 40; P.A. 09-9, S. 31; P.A. 13-310, S. 1; P.A. 22-26, S. 22.)
History: P.A. 82-325 changed effective date of Nov. Sp. Sess. P.A. 81-4 but without affecting this section; P.A. 90-261 made provisions of section applicable “In any civil or criminal matter”; P.A. 99-119 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a), added Subsec. (b) establishing a rebuttable presumption of indigency if certain criteria are met, and added Subsec. (c) providing that nothing precludes a court from finding a person whose income does not meet such criteria is indigent and requiring the court clerk upon the applicant's request to schedule a hearing on an application for a fee waiver that has been denied; P.A. 04-76 amended Subsec. (b) by deleting reference to “general assistance”; P.A. 09-9 amended Subsec. (b) by replacing “food stamps” with “supplemental nutrition assistance” and making a technical change, effective May 4, 2009; P.A. 13-310 amended Subsec. (c) by designating existing provision re court's authority to find that a person whose income does not meet criteria specified in Subsec. (b) is indigent and unable to pay fee as Subdiv. (1), adding Subdiv. (2) re court's authority to deny application for a fee waiver or a waiver of the cost of service of process when applicant has engaged in a pattern of previous frivolous filings and the granting of application would constitute a flagrant misuse of Judicial Branch resources, and adding “Nothing in this section shall affect the inherent authority of the court to manage its docket.”; P.A. 22-26 added Subsec. (d) re filing of petition to the Appellate Court for review of order denying application for fee waiver to commence civil or habeas action in the Superior Court or serve process in such action.
CASE INFORMATION
NHH-CV24-6024196-S | ANSONIA STATE STREET, LLC v. BRADLEY, ANNE | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Prefix: HSG | Case Type: H00 | File Date: 10/30/2024 | Return Date: 11/04/2024 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AFTER TRIAL
ANSONIA STATE STREET, LLC VS ANNE BRADLEY
NHH-CV24-6024196-S
Plaintiff, Ansonia State Street, LLC, brought a summary process action for non-payment of rent against Defendant, Anne Bradley, seeking to recover possession of 360 State Street, Apt 719 in New Haven, Connecticut. The complaint alleges that Defendant remains in possession of the premises despite failing to pay rent on August and September, 2024 Defendant filed an answer disagreeing with the
allegations and raising special defense of payment. The case was tried on
January 13, 2025. Plaintiff was represented by countsel. The property manager for
Plaintiff testified and submitted evidence. Defendant testified and submitted
evidence.
The Court fully considered and weighed all of the testimony and evidence received at trial; evaluated the credibility of the witnesses; assessed the weight, if any, to be
given specific evidence and measured the probabative force of conflicting evidence; has
drawn such inferences from the evidence, or facts established by the evidence that
It deems reasonable and logical; reviewed and considered all the relevent pleadings,
Evidence, and law, as well as balanced the equitable positions of the parties.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
The Court makes the following factual findings:
Plaintiff purchased property commonly known as 360 State Street in November,
2022. At the time of the purchase, Defendant was residing at the premises pursuant
2023. To a one-year lease agreement from 2013 that automatically renewed on a month-to
Month basis upon the expiration of the lease.
At the time of the original lease and through current, the total amount of rent due
is $932. Because Defendant receives assistance from Section 8, she only pays a
Portion of the rental amount. Her portion of is rent is determined annually after she
Completes an annual recertification. Previously, her portion was $198. In January, 2022, Defendant’s portion was determined to be $264. Defendant has continued,
However, to make payments of $198 per month, for a shortfall of $66 per month.
On September 13, 2024, Plaintiff had served a notice to quit for nonpayment of rent on August 2024 and September 2024, with a quit date of October 18, 2024.
Defendant remains in possession of of the premises.
DISCUSSION
Summary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an
Expeditious remedy…It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased
Premesis without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-
law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their
Terms. “Pollansky v Pollansky, 144 Conn. App 188, 191 (2013)
To prevail on a claim for nonpayment of rent, Plaintiff must establish the following
essential elements: (1) a rental agreement; (2) that Plaintiff is the lessor or owner of
The subject premesis; (3) the address of the subject premises; (4) the amount of rent
Due to Plaintiff from Defendant; (5) when the rent was due to Plaintiff; (6) the date
of the nonpayment of rent; (7) the service of the notice to quit, as well as its service date
and termination date; and (8) that Defendant is still in possession. General Statutes
* 47a-15a et seq.
The only element that is disputed in this case is the amount of rent that was due to
Plaintiff. Kyle Huckle, the property manager for the Plaintiff, credibly testified that
The Housing Authority of New Haven pays $668 of the $932 due for rent, leaving the
Balance of $264 as Defendant’s portion. His testimony was corroborated by a
recertification letter received by Plaintiff indicating that Defendant’s portion
Became $264 as of January 1, 2022.
Although Defendant contends that she has paid her rent in full and on time every
Month, and provided receipts of her $198 payments for July, August and
September, her testimony also demonstrates that she knew or should have known
that her rental portion was $264. Specifically, Defendant testified that every month
That she made a rental payment she would ask for, and receive a ledger to confirm
That her payment had been credited to her account. The ledger admitted to evidence
shows that beginning in January, 2023, when Plaintiff began listing the Section 8
and tenant portions separately, Defendant’s portion was $264 per month.
Defendant also testified that she had not received the recertification letter from
Section 8 because she does not receive mail at her apartment. There was no
testimony, however, that she has her mail forwarded to a post office box or that she
Provided the Housing Authority with a change of mailing address form when she
decided to longer check her mail at the premises. Defendant’s failure to pick up her
mail does not resolve her of the obligation to be aware of her tenant portion. For
August and September, 2024. Defendant was required to pay $264 per month. She
paid $198 per month. Accordingly, Plaintiff has established all of the elements for
Nonpayment of rent and Defendant’s special defense fails.
The Court hereby enters judgment of possession in favor of Plaintiff. Balancing the
Equities, the Court will stay of execution until March 31, 2026, with a use and
Occupancy payment of $264 due by the 10th for February and March.
BY THE COURT,
Alayna Stone
Alayna M. Stone, Judge
Using Juris No. 445561
Yet fails to document it here
ANSWER AND SPECIAL DEFENSES
Submitted to the court when the chief clerk failed to docket the case!
Everything listed by the Plaintiff was DENIED because they were lies!
Additionally,
Section 2:
a. All rent has been paid to the landlord
b-d were irrelevant
e. I notified Housing Code (Complaint) CV24-5005875
f. This eviction is being brought because I contacted public officials or agencies to complain about my apartment (The maintenance manager used violence, smashing in my door while I was taking a bath! I screamed for my life and the neighbors were obviously told I was having an orgasm by the depraved management here! I have already stated this and made it very clear of the numerour unlawful entries, vandalism, theft and on two occasions, physical harm to me!)
Additional reasons why I should not be evicted:
1. Section 8 rent is paid timely every month since Jan 2013; 2. There is no mortgage closing . Aon property and no addendum regarding name and contact information on new landlord. 3. Media published the $2.2 billion bldg to be sold for only$100 million yet they have an $89 billion third mortgage with no closing on prior two mortgages 4. Case No. NHH-CV24-5005875-S was entered against Ansonia State Street, et al 5. Defendant Anne M. Bradley is disabled and tired of this abuse and bullying. NO MERIT TO PLAINTIFF’S CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT ANNE M. BRADLEY. ATTY HOOPS IS A FRAUD USING PRO HAC VICE APPEARANCE!
Thereafter I realized that there are apparently three “Peter Hoops” - and the grandfather is the attorney, who entered the BAR in 1987. The son frauded, saying he was Attorney Peter Hoops; and the grandson really did a botched job frauding at the 10/31/2024 hearing, saying HE was Attorney Peter Hoops! I attached a statement also, elaborating on the corruption in processing and the illegal Summons since I was paying rent into court! Rent cannot be paid into court unless the court determines that rent is current! The ledger also stated the rent was current! I also had great struggles with cyber crime and though the statement has some substance, I had more detail taken from the Housing Complaint, which I had referred to in my Answer above. I also emphasized there was no DUE PROCESS OF LAW. It was later I realized that Alayna Stone was a fraud and obviously not an attorney, with a fake Juris number - which is probably why she left it off her “Memorandum of Law” on the illegal eviction case - and yet failed to abide by the Rules of Court in issuing a Memo of Law for the Housing Complaint Appeal. A Memo of Law is always required!
CASE INFORMATION
BRADLEY VS ANSONIA STATE STREET, ET AL
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DOCKET NO: NHHCV245006875S BRADLEY, ANNE M V. ANSONIA STATE STREET, LLC Et Al SUPERIOR COURT HOUSING SESSION AT NEW HAVEN 1/16/2025 ORDER ORDER REGARDING: 01/16/2025 138.00 MOTION TO OPEN JUDGMENT - HOUSING The foregoing, having been considered by the Court, is hereby: ORDER: DENIED Motion to open denied. Judicial Notice (JDNO) was sent regarding this order. 445561 Judge: ALAYNA M STON
DEFINITION OF NONSUIT: A court’s dismissal of a case or of a defendant because the plaintiff has failed to make out a legal case or to bring forward sufficient evidence.
2024 Connecticut General Statutes
Title 52 - Civil Actions
Chapter 900 - Court Practice and Procedure
Section 52-212. - Opening judgment upon default or nonsuit.
Universal Citation:
CT Gen Stat § 52-212. (2024)
Learn moreThis media-neutral citation is based on the American Association of Law Libraries Universal Citation Guide and is not necessarily the official citation.
(a) Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the Superior Court may be set aside, within four months following the date on which the notice of judgment or decree was sent, and the case reinstated on the docket, on such terms in respect to costs as the court deems reasonable, upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment or the passage of the decree, and that the plaintiff or defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from prosecuting the action or making the defense.
(b) In addition to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, any judgment rendered or decree passed in an action for dissolution of marriage or civil union or for legal separation upon default of appearance of the defendant pursuant to subsection (b) of section 46b-67 may be set aside at any time and the case reinstated to the docket upon a showing of material misrepresentation in the affidavit of the plaintiff filed pursuant to said subsection.
(c) The complaint or written motion shall be verified by the oath of the complainant or his attorney, shall state in general terms the nature of the claim or defense and shall particularly set forth the reason why the plaintiff or defendant failed to appear.
(d) The court shall order reasonable notice of the pendency of the complaint or written motion to be given to the adverse party, and may enjoin him against enforcing the judgment or decree until the decision upon the complaint or written motion.
(1949 Rev., S. 7963, 7964; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 114; 1967, P.A. 849; P.A. 74-183, S. 87, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 131, 681; P.A. 82-160, S. 102; P.A. 18-14, S. 3; P.A. 21-104, S. 43; P.A. 23-46, S. 20.)
History: 1959 act substituted circuit court for municipal court which was abolished; 1967 act clarified rights of plaintiff; P.A. 74-183 removed circuit court from purview of section, reflecting transfer of its functions to court of common pleas, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 removed court of common pleas from purview of section, reflecting transfer of all trial jurisdiction to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 18-14 added new Subsec. (b) re setting aside of judgment or decree in action for dissolution of marriage or civil union or legal separation when waiting period had been waived pursuant to Sec. 46b-67(c) and redesignated existing Subsecs. (b) and (c) as Subsecs. (c) and (d); P.A. 21-104 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “it was rendered or passed” with “the notice of judgment or decree was sent”, effective June 28, 2021; P.A. 23-46 amended Subsec. (b) by replacing “in which the waiting period was waived pursuant to subsection (c) of section 46b-67” with “upon default of appearance of the defendant pursuant to subsection (b) of section 46b-67”.
Disclaimer: These codes may not be the most recent version. Connecticut may have more current or accurate information. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or the information linked to on the state site. Please check official sources.
NONSUIT: A court’s dismissal of a case or of a defendant because the plaintiff failed to make out a legal case or to bringh sufficient evidence.
MOTION TO OPEN
Sec. 17-4. Setting Aside or Opening Judgments (a) Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, any civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months succeeding the date on which notice was sent. The parties may waive the provisions of this subsection or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of the court. (b) Upon the filing of a motion to open or set aside a civil judgment, except a judgment in a juvenile matter, the moving party shall pay to the 259 clerk the filing fee prescribed by statute unless such fee has been waived by the judicial authority. (c) The expedited procedures set forth in this subsection may be followed with regard to a motion to open a judgment of foreclosure filed by a plaintiff in which the filing fee has been paid, the motion has been filed prior to the vesting of title or the sale date, the plaintiff states in the motion that the committee and appraisal fees have been paid or will be paid within thirty days of court approval, and the motion has been served on each party as provided by Sections 10-12 through 10-17 and with proof of service endorsed thereon. (1) Parties shall have five days from the filing of the motion to file an objection with the court. Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority, the motion shall be heard not less than seven days after the date the motion was filed. If the plaintiff states in the motion that all appearing parties have received actual notice of the motion and are in agreement with it, the judicial authority may grant the motion without a hearing. (2) When a motion to open judgment is filed pursuant to this subsection, the court will retain jurisdiction over the action to award committee fees and expenses and appraisal fees, if necessary. If judgment is not entered or the case has not been withdrawn within 120 days of the granting of the motion, the judicial authority shall forthwith enter a judgment of dismissal. (P.B. 1978-1997, Sec. 326.) (Amended June 22, 2009, to take effect Jan. 1, 2010; amended June 21, 2010, to take effect Jan. 1, 2011.
Sec. 17-43. Opening Judgment upon Default or Nonsuit (a) Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit may be set aside within four months succeeding the date on which notice was sent, and the case reinstated on the docket on such terms in respect to costs as the judicial authority deems reasonable, upon the written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed at the time of the rendition of such judgment or the passage of such decree, and that the plaintiff or the defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from prosecuting or appearing to make the same. Such written motion shall be verified by the oath of the complainant or the complainant’s attorney, shall state in general terms the nature of the claim or defense and shall particularly set forth the reason why the plaintiff or the defendant failed to appear. The judicial authority shall order reasonable notice of the pendency of such written motion to be given to the adverse party, and may enjoin that party against enforcing such judgment or decree until the decision upon such written motion. (b) If the judicial authority opens a nonsuit entered pursuant to Section 17-31, the judicial authority as part of its order may extend the time for filing pleadings or disclosure. (See General Statutes § 52-212.) (P.B. 1978-1997, Sec. 377.)
Sec. 24-31. —Opening Judgment; Costs (a) The judicial authority may, upon motion, and after such notice by mail, or otherwise as it may order, open any judgment rendered under this procedure for lack of actual notice to a party, or, within four months from the date thereof, for any other cause that the judicial authority may deem sufficient, and may stay and supersede execution; except that the judicial authority may, for the reasons indicated above, open any judgment rendered by default at any time within four months succeeding the date upon which an execution was levied. The judicial authority may also order the repayment of any sum collected under such judgment and may render judgment and issue execution therefor. Costs in an amount fixed by the judicial authority and not exceeding $100 may be awarded, in the discretion of the judicial authority, for or against either party to a motion to open the judgment, and judgment may be rendered and execution may be issued therefor; and any action by the judicial authority may be conditioned upon the payment of such costs or the performance of any proper condition. (b) When a judgment has been rendered after a contested hearing on the merits, a motion to open shall be scheduled for hearing only upon order of the judicial authority. (P.B. 1978-1997, Sec. 584.) (Amended June 26, 2000, to take effect Jan. 1, 2001; amended June 21, 2010, to take effect Jan. 1, 2011.) Sec. 24-32. Execution in Small
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